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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tyson Michael Pieper appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty plea to
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine. On appeal, Pieper argues that
the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At around 10:30 p.m., Officer Weidebush and Officer Johns drove through the
Cherry Hill Park parking lot to do a patrol check. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 25, L. 23 – p. 28, L.
18, p. 41, L. 15 – p. 42, L. 7.) They saw two vehicles parked in the parking lot. (11/2/16
Tr., p. 25, L. 23 – p. 28, L. 18.) It was not normal for cars to be at the park at that time.
(11/2/16 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 9-14.) One of the cars had a blue light coming from inside.
(11/2/16 Tr., p. 41, L. 24 – p. 43, L. 14.) The officers parked their car and went to check
on the vehicle, which turned out to be the vehicle in which Pieper was sitting. (11/2/16
Tr., p. 25, L. 23 – p. 28, L. 18.)
The police car did not block Pieper’s car. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 9-21, p. 50, Ls.
8-22.) The officers did not turn on their car’s overhead lights. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 28, L. 22 –
p. 29, L. 22.) Nor did the officers use their car’s spotlight. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 9-13.)
Officer Johns approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and Officer Weidebush
approached the passenger side. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 8-15; see also Defendant’s Ex.
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A. 1) Both officers used flashlights to look into the interior of the car. (Id.)
Officer Johns asked Pieper, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, “Can I talk to you
guys?” (11/2/16 Tr., p. 37, L. 19 – p. 39, L. 10.) Pieper answered in the affirmative.
(Id.) Within seconds of making contact, Officer Weideman saw a “big ol’ jar of weed”
sitting in plain view in the back seat of the car. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 39, L. 19 – p. 40, L. 7, p.
31, L. 5 – p. 32, L. 4.) The following is transcribed from the officers’ body cameras
starting when Officer Johns made initial contact with Pieper:
Officer Johns: Can I talk to you guys?
Pieper: Yup.
Officer Johns: You got any I.D. on ya? Both of ya?
Pieper: Yeah, I got some in my bag here.
Officer Johns: We just hanging out in the park today?
Pieper: We’re just texting. I’m from Montana. We’re just …
Officer Weidebush: Holy Cow. Big ol’ jar of weed back here.

1

Defendant’s Exhibit A consists of recordings from Officer Johns’ and Officer
Weidebush’s body cameras. (See 11/2/16 Tr., p. 70, L. 24 – p. 72, L. 8.) The exhibit is
divided up into several files. The two most pertinent files are “1117441.avi” which is a
recording of the initial encounter from Officer Johns’ body camera, and “1117437.avi”
which is a recording of the same initial encounter but from Officer Weidebush’s body
camera.
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(Defendant’s Exhibit A, 1117441.avi at 0:00 to 0:15; 1117437.avi a 0:09 to 0:24. 2)
Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in plain view approximately 15 seconds after
Officer Johns made the initial contact. (See id.)
After being informed about the marijuana in the car, Officer Johns instructed
Pieper to step out of the vehicle and detained him in handcuffs. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 53, L. 13
– p. 54, L. 2.) Pursuant to the subsequent search, the officers found a gun, paraphernalia,
methamphetamine, morphine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, scales and baggies. (R., pp. 1422.)
The state charged Pieper with four counts of possession of a controlled substance.
(R., pp. 67-69.) Pieper filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the initial encounter was
not consensual and constituted a warrantless seizure. (R., pp. 51-53, 90-107.) The state
responded and argued that the initial encounter was consensual and no seizure occurred
until after Officer Weidebush observed marijuana in plain view in the backseat of the car.
(R., pp. 108-114.) The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. (R., pp.
115-118.) Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush testified. (See id.)
Officer Weidebush testified he saw the marijuana sitting in plain view in the
backseat of the car. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 20 – p. 33, L. 10.) The officers also testified
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Both of the officers’ body camera recordings were utilized in the above transcription,
which was transcribed by counsel for the respondent. The court also admitted a transcript
of various video clips as Defendant’s Exhibit B. (See 11/2/16 Tr., p. 70, L. 24 – p. 72, L.
8.) For reasons that are not clear in the record, these transcriptions separate out the
interaction between Officer Johns and Pieper and the interaction between Officer
Weidebush and the car passenger. (See Defendant’s Ex. B.) However, for purposes of
determining when the encounter changed from a consensual encounter to a detention, it is
important to note when Officer Weidebush informed Officer Johns there is a “big ol’ jar
of weed back here.”
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that when they approached the car, they did not have their guns drawn, nor did they issue
any commands, orders or threats. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 33, L. 11 – p. 34, L. 22, p. 51, L. 18 –
p. 53, L. 12.)
The district court denied Pieper’s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 119-120.) The
district court found that the encounter was consensual up until Officer Weidebush
observed the marijuana and Officer Johns ordered Pieper out of the car. (11/2/16 Tr., p.
67, L. 17 – p. 70, L. 16.) Pieper pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, and reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to
suppress on appeal. (R., pp. 122-130.) The state dismissed the remaining charges. (Id.)
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Pieper to five years with one year
fixed. (R., pp. 134-136.) Pieper timely appealed. (R., pp. 137-141.)

4

ISSUE
Pieper states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Pieper’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Pieper failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Determined That The Initial Encounter Between
The Officers And Pieper Was Consensual
A.

Introduction
Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush approached Pieper’s parked car and asked to

speak with him and the other occupant of the vehicle. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 37, L. 19 – p. 39,
L. 10.) Pieper agreed. (Id.) Officer Johns asked if Pieper had any identification and,
while Pieper was looking for his identification, Officer Weidebush saw a “big ol’ jar of
weed” in the back seat. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 39, L. 19 – p. 40, L. 7, p. 31, L. 5 – p. 32, L. 4.)
Officer Johns then ordered the occupants out of the car. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 53, L. 13 – p. 54,
L. 2.) The district court ruled that no seizure occurred until Officer Johns gave the order
to exit the car. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 67, L. 17 – p. 70, L. 16.) The district court did not err.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to those facts.” State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739,
741 (2007). The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. ValdezMolina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552,
555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court also gives deference to any
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133
Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
6

C.

Pieper Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Determined That
The Initial Approach And Question About Identification Did Not Constitute A
Seizure
“An encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger

Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual.” State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho
482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citations omitted). To constitute a seizure, the officer
must, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” in some way restrain an
individual’s liberty. Id. This “requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement
officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her
to restrict his or her movement.” Id. (citations omitted). “[A] request for identification or
mere questioning is not enough, by itself[,] to constitute a seizure.” State v. Landreth,
139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2004) (citations omitted). “This is so because
the person approached need not answer any question put to him and may decline to listen
to the questions at all and go about his business.” State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497498 (1983)). “Thus, where an officer merely approaches a person who is standing on the
street, or seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public place, and poses a few
questions, no seizure has occurred.” Id. (citation omitted). The relevant inquiry is
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would feel free to
disregard the law enforcement officer”; if so, “then the encounter is consensual.”
Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486, 211 P.3d at 95.
Here, the district court found that the initial encounter between Pieper and Officer
Johns was consensual. (11/2/16 Tr., p. 67, L. 17 – p. 70, L. 16.) The district court
examined applicable law that officers “may generally ask the individual questions and ask
7

to examine identification.” (Id.) The district court found that the officers gave no
commands until Officer Weidebush saw the marijuana in plain view and Officer Johns
ordered Pieper out of the car. (Id. (“There’s no command until: ‘Get out of the car. Put
your hands behind you back,’ after the statement being made by Weidebush that he saw a
big old jar of weed.”).) The Court reasoned:
So, what did the police do here or not do to convey a message that
compliance with their requests is required?
This by all appearances happened very rapidly. And I’m finding
that there is no – well, regardless of where you put the burden of proof,
whether the defendant has the burden of proving seizure, or the plaintiff
has the burden of proving consensual encounter. The plaintiffs met that
burden. The defendant has failed to meet its burden.
At all times up to when Officer Johns told the defendant to get out
of the car, put his hands behind their back, this is at all times a consensual
encounter.
The fact there’s two officers; that fact that it’s at night, everything
is – that doesn’t change my analysis. It’s consensual. It’s asking
questions. There’s no command until: “Get out of the car. Put your hands
behind you back,” after the statement being made by Weidebush that he
saw a big old jar of weed.
And from that point and – and the “big old jar of weed” isn’t going
to be suppressed. It’s only statements that were made from that point in
time on, from the time that Johns said based on Weidebush’s response,
“There’s a big old jar of weed; put your hands behind your back,” and
cuffs him, until Miranda is read, if it’s ever read, I don’t know if it is, then
any statements are suppressed, any statements by the defendant are
suppressed, but not the evidence, not the – not the weed.
So, I mean, up until that point in time, there’s no suppression of
any statements. And there’s – there’s no suppression of the – of the – if
it’s weed that was found.
And I don’t know of any – I haven’t been cited any case law that
would say that you can’t use a flashlight to find out what’s and who’s
inside a car. And that’s plain view with the assistance of a flashlight at
night. I don’t know. I have not been cited to anything that tells me that
that’s improper.
Certainly, the location of the officers’ car is not something that
would make a reasonable citizen feel that he was being restrained, didn’t
have the ability to leave. And that’s the standard. It’s not what happens at
Wendy’s. It’s whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the
police officer’s requests and leave. And – and I find that that isn’t the
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case; that hasn’t been proven up until the time that John – or that – yeah –
that Johns says based on Weidebush’s claim that there’s a big old pot of
weed in the back, jar of weed in the back, “Get out of the car,” Johns says,
and, “Put your hands behind your back.” That’s when there’s a seizure.
That’s when it’s no longer consensual. That’s when Miranda was needed
for anything not to be suppressed.
So that’s my ruling.
(11/2/16 Tr., p. 68, L. 16 – p. 70, L. 16.)
The district court did not err. Up and until Officer Weidebush saw the marijuana
and Johns ordered Pieper out of the car, the encounter was consensual. On appeal, Pieper
first argues that the encounter was not consensual because Pieper was seized when
Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush approached his car with flashlights.

(See

Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) Second, Pieper argues he was seized when Officer Johns
asked for identification because, if he ignored the request for identification, he would
have violated Idaho Code §§ 18-705 (resisting and obstructing officers) and 49-316
(driver’s license to be carried and exhibited on demand). (See id.) Both of Pieper’s
arguments fail.
First, the fact that the officers approached the car with flashlights did not
transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure. Simply approaching a car
with flashlights is not physical force or a show of authority that would restrain Pieper’s
individual liberty. “A majority of jurisdictions have held that ‘the mere approach and
questioning of [persons in parked vehicles] does not constitute a seizure.’” State v.
Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting W. LaFave, Search
and Seizure § 9.2(h), at 415–16 and 408–409 n. 230 (2nd ed. 1987)); cf. State v. Ramirez,
121 Idaho 319, 322, 824 P.2d 894, 897 (Ct. App. 1991) (“An officer’s use of a flashlight
to illuminate the darkened interior of a vehicle” is not a search.).
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Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be
compelled.
State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 168, 267 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). “Other circumstances that may
indicate seizure include whether the officer used overhead emergency lights and whether
the officer took action to block a vehicle’s exit route.” Id. (citing Willoughby, 147 Idaho
at 487–88, 211 P.3d at 96–97; State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 302–03, 47 P.3d 1271,
1272–73 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct. App.
1991)). The Court of Appeals in Liechty explained that “no seizure occurred when the
officer approached Liechty’s parked vehicle and tapped on his window.” Id. “Further,
the officer, without activating his overhead lights, approached Liechty’s vehicle alone,
without a weapon drawn, and did not physically touch Liechty or use threatening
language upon opening the passenger door.” Id. The seizure in Liechty only occurred
because the officer opened the passenger door without Liechty’s consent, stood in the
open passenger doorway, blocked Liechty’s exit, and questioned him. Id. at 169, 267
P.3d at 1284; compare State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523, 826 P.2d 481, 484 (Ct. App.
1991) (no seizure initially occurred when the police first approached Osborne’s vehicle,
which was parked on a public street).
In Fry, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the police encounter was not
consensual and that Fry was “seized.” See Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945. In
Fry, the officers approached Fry who was sitting in a parked vehicle. Id. The Court of
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Appeals found it significant that one of the officers, Officer Dunbar, “placed himself
directly behind Fry’s vehicle, the front end of which was nearly against the wall of a
building, making it impossible for Fry to drive away without running over Officer
Dunbar.” Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush approached Pieper’s car, which was
parked in a public parking lot, did not block Pieper’s exit, did not activate overhead
lights, did not physically touch Pieper, and did not use threatening language. Because the
officers simply approached Pieper’s car with flashlights and did not utilize physical force
or a show of authority to restrain Pieper’s individual liberty, the encounter was
consensual and no seizure occurred.
Second, Officer Johns’ inquiry about identification did not turn the consensual
encounter into a seizure. “Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine
identification.” Fry, 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d at 944 (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469
U.S. 1 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 701
P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985)). Here, Officer Johns asked for permission to speak to Pieper,
which was granted, and then asked if Pieper had any identification.
Pieper’s arguments regarding Idaho Code §§ 18-705 (resisting and obstructing
officers) and 49-316 (driver’s license to be carried and exhibited on demand) are similarly
unavailing. Idaho Code § 18-705 states that anyone who “willfully resists, delays or
obstructs any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his
office or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer” is guilty of a
misdemeanor. I.C. § 18-705. Nothing in Idaho Code § 18-705 makes it illegal to refuse
11

to give identification to an officer. Further, contrary to Pieper’s assertions, Officer Johns
never “demanded” to see his identification. Rather, after Pieper agreed to talk with him,
Officer Johns simply asked whether Pieper and the passenger had “got any I.D.” on them.
Because Officer Johns never ordered Pieper to produce identification, Pieper would not
have been subject to criminal liability by not giving it to him.
For similar reasons, Pieper also would not have been subject to liability under
Idaho Code § 49-316. That statute states: “Every licensee shall have his driver’s license
in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall, upon
demand, surrender the driver’s license into the hands of a peace officer for his
inspection.” I.C. § 49-316. Again, asking if Pieper had any I.D. was not a demand to
produce a license. Even if it was, Pieper was not required by Idaho Code § 49-316 to
produce a license because he was not “operating” a motor vehicle at the time. The
vehicle was parked, and at no time during the interaction was the vehicle in operation.
Additionally, Officer Johns never actually took possession of Pieper’s driver’s license.
According to the video recording, Pieper was still looking for the license when Officer
Weidebush saw the marijuana in plain view.
In Osborne, supra the Court noted that a seizure does not occur when “an officer
merely approaches a person who is ... seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public
place, and poses a few questions[.]” Osborne, 121 Idaho at 523, 826 P.2d at 484
(citations omitted). In Osborne, the Court of Appeals concluded that no seizure occurred
when the police approached Osborne’s vehicle, which was parked on a public street. Id.
However, because Osborne was sitting in the driver’s seat with the engine running, a
seizure occurred when the officers asked for Osborne’s driver’s license. Id. The Court
12

reasoned that because Idaho Code § 49-316 required Osborne to have a license when
operating a motor vehicle, Osborne was legally required to comply with the officer’s
request and could not drive away without violating the law. Id. Thus, under those
circumstances, Osborne could not have reasonably believed he was at liberty to ignore the
officers and go about his business. Id.
In contrast, Pieper was not operating his motor vehicle. He was sitting in a fully
stopped and parked car in a parking lot. Further, there was no evidence in Osborne that
the officers first asked permission to speak with Osborne. See id. Here, before asking
whether Pieper had any I.D., Officer Johns asked “Can I talk to you guys?” Based upon
the totality of the circumstances, the question regarding whether Pieper possessed any
identification did not constitute a seizure.
In addition, the Osborne Court concluded, “Accordingly, we conclude that
Osborne was ‘seized’ within the meaning of the fourth amendment when Deputy Costello
took his license.” Id. In the present case, Deputy Johns never actually took, much less
retained, Pieper’s license prior to the discovery of the marijuana.

“This Court has

previously held that a limited detention does occur when an officer retains a driver’s
license or other paperwork of value.” State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844,103 P.3d 454,
457 (2004) (citing State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493, 826 P.2d 452, 454 (1992); State
v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 439, 34 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Ct. App. 2001)). As the video
evidence establishes, Officer Johns asked if Pieper had any identification, and while
Pieper was looking for it, Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in plain view. (See
Defendant’s Exhibit A, 1117441.avi at 0:00 to 0:15; 1117437.avi a 0:09 to 0:24.)
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Further, even if the inquiry about identification constituted a “seizure,” it was
reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that
if the initial contact is valid and lawful, a brief detention of a driver to do a status check
on the driver’s license is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. State v.
Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (1992) (“[W]e conclude … that a police
officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after
making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth
amendment.”).

Here, Officer Johns’ initial contact with Pieper (“Can I talk to you

guys?”) followed by Pieper’s consent was a valid, lawful contact. Thus even if Officer
Johns had actually taken Pieper’s driver’s license and run a status check on that license,
that would have been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Pieper was not detained until after Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in
plain view. An officer may seize an individual if the officer has reasonable, articulable
suspicions that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. See Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Fry, 122 Idaho
at 103, 831 P.2d at 945. Officer Weidebush’s observation of the marijuana was not a
“search” within the meaning of the Constitution. Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 322, 824 P.2d at
897 (“An officer’s use of a flashlight to illuminate the darkened interior of a vehicle does
not raise the officer’s observation to the level of a search.”) (citation omitted). “It is wellestablished that the observation of items in public view is not a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Constitution and therefore is not subject to fourth amendment scrutiny.”
Id. (citations omitted). Once Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in plain view, he
and Officer Johns had reasonable suspicion to detain Pieper and the passenger of the car.
14

The district court did not err by finding that the initial 15-second encounter was
consensual.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 7th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson______________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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